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INTRODUCTION
Even  before the  initiatives which brought  about the  Canada-United  States Trade
Agreement  (CUSTA)  and,  subsequently,  the  North  American  Free  Trade  Agreement
(NAFTA),  trade  in  red meat  and  livestock  between  the United  States  and  Canada  was
characterized  by  low levels of formal trade barriers.  Tariff levels were  so low  as to  be
considered  a nuisance rather than a real barrier to trade (Kerr and  Cullen,  1985).  Import
quotas on beef from Canada could be put in place under the U.S. Meat  Import Quota Law
and while the imposition of quotas disrupted commercial transactions  in the short run, they
were  imposed so  seldom that they were,  again,  considered more  of an annoyance than  an
important trade barrier (Kerr,  et al  ,1986).  Prior to the CUSTA, the beef and pork sectors
were often offered as examples of the kind of North American Market that could be achieved
with the removal of trade barriers under a Canada-U.S.  agreement.
It was recognized in the run up to the CUSTA negotiations that a considerable number
of non-tariff barriers existed  which limited the potential to create a truly integrated market
in beef and pork (Bruce and Kerr, 1986).  These non-tariff barriers  included:  (1) contingent
protection; (2) health and sanitary regulations;  and (3)  consumer regulations.  It was agreed
that some of these non-tariff barriers would be directly  eliminated in the text of the CUSTA.
In other cases, it was agreed that ongoing negotiations would take place to eliminate existing
non-tariff barriers through harmonization,  national treatment, or the granting of equivalence.
Consultative  mechanisms were  to be put in place to prevent  new non-tariff barriers  from
arising  (Kerr,  1988).  The CUSTA was  signed with considerable  optimism  that  a Single
Market for livestock and red meat products would be achieved relatively  quickly.
Prior to the NAFTA being signed,  formal trade barriers in  livestock, pork and beef
between the  United  States  and Mexico  were,  with  a  few  exceptions,  relatively  benign.
Further,  as part of its internal  deregulation and restructuring initiatives, Mexico was already
eliminating many of its trade restrictions (Gerber  and Kerr,  1995).  Mexico had removed its164  Proceedings
tariffs on cattle and beef and was in the process of eliminating an export tax on feeder cattle
(Rosson  et al.,  1993).  Live hogs and pork products,  however,  faced a 20 percent import
tariff.  Mexico's extensive  import licensing  system was largely absent in the livestock and
red meat sectors.
Mexican exports faced U.S. tariffs on feeder cattle of approximately  1.5 percent and
for finished  livestock and meat of approximately  six percent ad  valorem. Mexican  beef was
also subject to the U.S.  Meat Import Quota Law.  As in the case of Canada,  these  formal
barriers were not considered  significant inhibitors of international  trade.  Health  and sanitary
restrictions,  however, presented  considerable hurdles for many Mexican processors.  In the
NAFTA,  all  three  countries  agreed  to  eliminate  their  formal  trade  barriers  and  to  put
mechanisms in place to reduce or eliminate non-tariff barriers.
The  new  World  Trade  Organization/General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade
(WTO/GATT)  added additional weight to the need to cooperate to remove non-tariff barriers
to trade through the provisions of the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures,
the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, the Agreement  on Implementation  of Article
VI  (Anti- Dumping) and the Agreement  on Subsidies and Countervailing  Measures.
Once the provisions and mechanisms  to reduce non-tariff barriers  to trade in livestock
and red meat products  had been negotiated  and  agreed  in the CUSTA/NAFTA,  many of
those involved in providing input into the negotiation process-  livestock producers, meat
packers, academics,  government officials-  simply sat back with the expectation that what
had  been agreed  to would be  carried  out.  While  it  is probably  too  early  to know  how
effective the provisions of the NAFTA  and the WTO/GATT will be, the CUSTA has been
in operation for seven years and some insights as to how the progress to a Single Continental
Market in red meat and livestock  is evolving should be discernible.  The evidence  to date is
disappointing.  This does not mean that no progress has been made, but it is far short of what
was expected (except  by the  most cynical of observers)  when the CUSTA was  signed.
The  disappointing  rate  of progress  on  the elimination  of non-tariff barriers  to  the
movement of livestock and red meat suggests that the process needs to be re-examined  and
that a new theoretical  approach to the problem may be warranted.  This paper suggests (but
does not fully develop) a new theoretical  framework  for examining trade liberalization/trade
disputes relating to non-tariff barriers, provides some examples  of the difficulties associated
with  liberalizing  non-tariff  barriers  and  indicates  how  further  liberalization  might  be
approached.
THE NEW  INSTITUTIONAL  ECONOMICS  OF  LIBERALIZING  NON-TARIFF
BARRIERS TO TRADE
In moving from trade liberalization based on the removal of formal barriers to trade
such as tariffs  and import quotas to international market  integration based on the removal of
non-tariff barriers  to trade, the nature of international  interaction changes.  A sophisticated
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set of domestic  and international  institutions  has evolved  over  a  long period of time to
facilitate  the  reduction  and  elimination  of formal  trade  barriers.  Specific  and  easily
identifiable government departments administer import tariffs and import quotas.  The Office
of the  U.S.  Trade  Representative  or  the  Department  of Foreign  Affairs  in  Canada  is
responsible for trade negotiations  in multi-lateral forums such as the WTO or bi-laterally as
in the NAFTA.  Thus, it is relatively  easy for those who have a vested interest in having a
formal trade barrier reduced or removed to identify to whom they must make their case.  The
officials in these departments  are professionals whose direct concern is the formulation and
administration of trade policy.  While it may take considerable lobbying resources to achieve
one's goal, once it has been achieved through international  agreement, an interested party can
have considerable confidence that it will be carried out.
The tariff reductions  offered at the GATT or the tariff elimination schedules agreed
to in the NAFTA are implemented automatically by the department which is responsible  for
administering  tariffs.  If tariffs  are  not  removed on  schedule, their  continued  collection
provides a smoking gun of evidence which cannot easily be denied.  Channels where one can
formally complain exist and dispute mechanisms  are available if no satisfaction  is received
from consultation.  Similarly, the removal of import quotas is relatively automatic once they
have  been agreed to.  There are  seldom complaints  that countries  fail to live up  to their
commitments to remove tariffs or import quotas.
On the other hand, commitments relating to the removal of non-tariff barriers often
pertain to ongoing consultations and negotiations.  The regulations which constitute the non-
tariff barriers to trade in livestock and red meat products are scattered among a large number
of  government  departments,  agencies  and  sub-agencies.  Trade  liberalization  and  the
administration of international trade is not the primary function of these institutions.  Their
personnel  are not experts in international trade law.  Simply because the trade negotiation
arm of government has agreed to procedures aimed at the eventual liberalization of non-tariff
barriers does not mean that the agreed liberalization  will be carried out or that a satisfactory
resolution to ongoing discussions will be reached.  Those who  negotiate trade agreements
have no direct authority to influence events in other government departments  or agencies nor
do they have a vested interest in seeing that what has been agreed to is implemented. Hence,
to  ensure  that  progress  continues  to  be  made,  those  who  have  a  vested  interest  in
liberalization of  the sector must be much more active after a trade agreement is signed than
is  the  case  when  the  removal  of  formal  barriers  to  trade  is  the  primary  objective  of
liberalization initiatives. While these difficulties might appear to be primarily  a principle-
agent problem, and certainly they have aspects to which that analytical approach applies,  it
is only part of the problem.  Adapting the  transaction cost  approach of New Institutional
Economics  may provide  broader insights into  the liberalization process  pertaining  to the
removal of non-tariff barriers.
One of the central  tenets of New Institutional Economics  is that transactions  do not
occur in the frictionless  economic environment assumed in standard neoclassical  economic
analysis (Hobbs,  1996).  This friction means that there are costs associated with organizing
economic  activity (Coase,  1937).  The costs are generally  referred to as transaction  costs.
Although transaction  costs can be identified in a broad spectrum of economic activities, one
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area  where there has  been particular  interest  is the  organization  of complex transactions.
Complex transactions  are those that involve production  and payment over time, which have
complicated quality and/or performance  specifications and where  the quality of the goods
exchanged  is not  transparent  (Kerr,  1996).  The  transaction  costs that  arise  in  complex
transactions  can be-divided  into three main classifications:  information  costs, negotiation
costs and monitoring/enforcement  costs.  According to Hobbs (1996):
Firms and individuals  face costs in the search for  information about products,
prices, inputs, and buyers and sellers. Negotiation costs arise from the physical
act of the transaction, such  as negotiating  and writing contracts  (costs in terms
of managerial  expertise,  the hiring of lawyers,  etc.)  or paying for the services
of an  intermediary  to  the  transaction  (such  as  an  auctioneer  or  a  broker).
Monitoring or enforcement  costs arise after an exchange has been negotiated.
This  may  involve  monitoring  the  quality  of  goods  from  a  supplier  or
monitoring  the  behaviour of a  supplier or buyer  to  ensure  that all  the  pre-
agreed terms of  the transaction are met.  Also included are the costs of legally
enforcing a broken contract,  should the need  arise (p.  17).
Trade  agreements  dealing  with the  removal  or reduction  of non-tariff barriers  to
international trade have many  elements which are similar to a complex  transaction.  As a
specific non-tariff barrier which is to be reduced  or eliminated is seldom directly  identified
in the trade agreement,  it is up to those who have an interest  in creating a Single Market to
search out information  about:  (1) trade inhibiting regulations and to quantify the costs they
impose on the economies  to which they apply;  (2)  the  organizations which  administer the
regulations  and  their  procedures  for changing  regulations;  (3)  the  individuals  within the
organizations  who have the power to initiate change;  and (4)  influential allies which can  be
enlisted  to  support  an  initiative  for  change.  It  should  be  noted that  proposals  for  the
reduction/elimination  of non-tariff barriers will have to come from those with an interest in
liberalization  since  politicians  or  government  bureaucrats  will  seldom  have  a  personal
interest  in  liberalization  (or  for  that  matter  protection).  These  information  gathering
activities  will require resources  and, hence, impose costs-  information costs-  on firms
or organizations  with an interest in liberalization.  Further,  in the case of non-tariff barriers,
considerable  intelligence  gathering activities must be ongoing to ensure that new regulations
do  not  arise  as  a result  of activities  unrelated  to trade  undertaken  by  various  regulatory
agencies  e.g.,  a  new sanitary  regulation  which  is being put  in place  for purely  domestic
reasons but which may have considerable  trade ramifications that have not occurred to the
scientists developing  the regulations.
Once the non-tariff barrier has been identified  and information has been obtained on
the relevant economic  actors, there will be costs  associated with securing an agreement  to
reduce  or eliminate the trade inhibiting effects  of the non-tariff barrier.  These  costs may
include  lobbying  those  responsible  for  initiating  legislative/regulatory  changes  in  the
government.  Studies may have to be commissioned to evaluate the welfare  effects of the
change.  Research  may  have  to  be funded to  provide  the  scientific  evidence  required to
convince those responsible  for administering regulatory  regimes.  Proposals  for regulatory
changes may have  to be drafted.  Input to hearings,  both public and private may have to be
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prepared and effectively delivered.  Formal and informal discussions with stakeholders in the
other country may be required.  These negotiation  costs will continue to be incurred until an
agreement  to take action on a non-tariff barrier is secured.
Securing  an agreement to take action on a non-tariff barrier,  however,  does not mean
that  the  agreed  undertaking will  actually  be carried  out.  In many  cases,  the  branch  of
government which agrees  to the undertaking may not be responsible for implementing the
change.  The state is not  a unified  actor (Kwon,  1995).  The  government consists of the
various  components  within  it,  which  have  different  preferences,  cultures  and  standard
operating procedures, and which play their roles interactively  in the decision-making process
(Allison,  1969).  Hence,  even  if the  bureaucracy  is  neutral,  those  with  an  interest  in
liberalization  will have to monitor the agency responsible for implementation  to ensure that
acceptable  progress is being made.  If the  changes which have been agreed to lead to job
losses, retraining or significant changes to standard operating procedures in the implementing
agency, then  the  agency  itself may  have  a  vested  interest  in  sabotaging  or  delaying the
changes  and,  hence,  will not  be a  neutral  actor.  This will raise the  costs of having the
changes implemented for those interested in liberalization.
As  those  with an  interest  in  securing  liberalization  may  not  have standing when
dealing  with the bureaucracy  in the  other country, they  may have to convince their  own
government to press  the  matter with the  other government.  As the officials  in the home
country's  government may have  a broad agenda for their dealings with the other country's
government,  the  particular  concern  may  become  a  poker chip  in  ongoing  bi-lateral
negotiations.  Hence, the actions of the home government officials also need to be monitored.
These activities  require staff and other resources.
If acceptable rates of progress cannot be discerned,  then the party with an interest  in
liberalization will have to work towards  having the dispute mechanism activated to ensure
that the agreement is enforced.  This will require the preparation of a case, convincing their
own  government  that the case  has  sufficient  merit for  it to proceed,  etc.  In the case  of
sanitary regulations  and some other non-tariff barriers the dispute settlement procedures are
less transparent than those relating to, for example,  dumping or countervail cases.  Taken
together, these  monitoring/enforcement  costs may be considerable.
In  the  case  of a  trade  agreement  (as  opposed  to  a  complex  transaction)  these
information,  negotiation  and  monitoring/enforcement  costs can be  designated fulfillment
costs -those  costs  associated  with  ensuring  that  the  benefits  expected  from  a  trade
agreement are actually realized or fulfilled.  While many of these topics are dealt with in the
political economy  literature, putting them into the fulfillment cost framework may be useful
for those who must allocate resources  to these activities and for identifying where action is
needed to reduce fulfillment costs in aid of facilitating the movement to  single continental
markets  for livestock,  beef and pork.  Table  1 provides  an illustrative  (but by no means a
comprehensive)  list of the fulfillment costs associated with trade agreements,  as well  as a
comparison  with  the  transaction  costs  which  are  typically  associated  with  complex
transactions.
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Identifying potential  Identifying non-tariff barrier
customers/suppliers
Acquiring product quality  Acquiring an understanding of the
information  specific regulations and how they
impact trade flows
Determining  the reputation  of  Identifying key political and
potential  customers/suppliers  administrative players
Acquiring and assessing price  Identifying potential allies  in both
information  countries
Acquiring information  on future  price
and/or product quality trends which
may alter the desirability  of the
transaction
Monitoring legislative and/or
regulatory initiatives  which may
increase the trade  inhibiting effects  of
non-tariff barriers
NEGOTIATION  Time spent developing and  Time spent lobbying and providing
COSTS  negotiating contract  offers  input into regulatory  hearings
Legal costs  of drawing  up formal  Legal and other costs  associated with
contracts  drawing  up proposals  for regulatory
changes
Formal assessments  of contract offers  Formal  assessments of the economic
in budget, financial  and production  (and  possibly other) benefits from
models  regulatory  reform
Informing suppliers/customers  of any  Informing and/or lobbying potential
affects of the proposed  contract on  allies  on either side  of the border
exiting relationships  such  as quality
or quantity changes  involving inputs
MONITORING  Monitoring the  activities of the other  Monitoring the activities  of foreign
AND  party to the contract to ensure that  legislatures  and bureaucracies  to
ENFORCEMENT  provisions of the contract are adhered  ensure that the agreed changes  are
COSTS  to - e.g. monitoring deliveries  to  taking place  and at an acceptable  rate
ensure  that they are of the quality  - i.e.  to ensure the expected  benefits
specified in the contract  from  trade are not nullified
Discussing any problems identified  Lobbying  foreign officials regarding
with  the other party  any problems identified,  if allowed,
and lobbying home  government to
press for implementation
Costs of preparing  a formal  legal case  Cost of preparing a case upon which
if contract  is breached  a dispute mechanism challenge can
be mounted
Court or arbitration costs  Preparing  for and responding to
dispute settlement activities directly
or through officials of the  home
government
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In terms of the NAFTA continental  market, one should expect fulfillment costs to rise
when different languages  are involved.  Mexican  organizations  will have to have staff (or
agents)  who are  fluent in English or French.  Canadian  and American  organizations  will
require  individuals  with a similar degree of capability  in  Spanish.  International  language
capability  cannot be expected among the domestic  bureaucracies which are responsible  for
framing  and  administering  the  regulations  that  constitute  non-tariff  barriers.  The
professionals who are charged with negotiating the reduction and elimination of formal trade
barriers  are, in contrast, likely to be multilingual or operate  in venues with a high degree of
translation capability.
How  significant  are  fulfillment  costs?  As  with  transactions  costs,  measuring
fulfillment costs is unlikely to be easy. According to Hobbs (1996):
...unlike  production  costs,  transactions  costs  - the  costs  of  economic
organization  are  neither  easy  to separate  from  other managerial  costs  nor
readily measurable.  (The problem is analogous  to the  difficulty accountants
have  in assigning  costs  of jointly used assets  to individual  enterprises  in a
multiple  enterprise  firm).  The  complex  nature  of companies  and  market
institutions  means that the costs of  their operation are not easy to quantify and
the  data which  one  might use to  measure  transaction  costs are  not  usually
collected  by governments or by the standard accountancy  practices of firms.
Although one  can recognize that there is indeed  a cost involved in valuing a
good or in monitoring the actions of a buyer or seller,  it is difficult to measure
these costs in financial  terms (p.  20).
Fulfillment  costs  will,  for  the  most  part,  have  the  same  overhead aspects  to  them  as
transaction  costs  and,  hence,  will be  difficult  to measure.  Certainly,  some  fulfillment
activities will have directly  measurable costs such as  legal fees and the hiring of economic
consultants to prepare studies.  Measuring fulfillment costs, however,  may not be particularly
important.  If they  can simply  be  identified  they  can provide insights  into the problems
associated with ensuring  that the benefits  expected  to arise from a trade agreement are not
nullified. A word of caution, however, the absolute level of fulfillment costs must be more
of a  concern  than transaction  costs because  competitive  forces  are  expected  to move  an
industry  toward  the  most transaction  cost  efficient  vertical  coordination  system,  ceteris
paribus (Gaisford,  et al  1994).  Fulfillment  costs relate primarily to ensuring  that activity
takes  place within  the political  and bureaucratic  arena  but  there will  be no  competitive
pressure to reduce them.  As a result, pro-active  measures  may be required to reduce these
costs; otherwise  fulfillment costs  may,  in themselves,  remain  a significant  barrier  to the
achievement of a single market.
While it may  not be easy to measure  fulfillment costs,  examples may  be found to
illustrate their importance.  If the agreed upon removal of a non-tariff barrier has not taken
place and, hence, the expected benefit from liberalization is nullified, this would suggest that
organizations  or firms with an  interest  in removing the non-tariff barrier did  not expend
sufficient  resources  on the  activity.  Alternatively,  the  fulfillment  costs  may  have been
sufficiently high so as to exceed the potential benefit from liberalization.  One suspects that
organizations  and firms have not yet adjusted to the higher costs associated with ensuring
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that liberalization  is realized in the case  of non-tariff barriers.  By explicitly identifying their
fulfillment costs, these organizations  may begin to allocate more resources to these activities.
They may  also realize that there may be benefits to attempting, individually  or collectively,
to reduce these costs.  In the next section, a number of examples from the livestock and red
meat  industries  are  presented  which  illustrate  the  problems  associated  the  failure  to
accomplish liberalization  already agreed to in trade negotiations.
NON-TARIFF  BARRIERS WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN  REMOVED OR REDUCED
IN LIVESTOCK AND  RED MEATS
This illustrative discussion will begin with two examples where specific commitments
to reduce or eliminate a non-tariff barrier were written directly  into the trade agreement  but
were  not  acted  upon.  In  these  cases,  organizations  or  firms  with  an  interest  in  the
liberalization  of  the  specific  provision  would  only  have  to  incur  monitoring  and/or
enforcement costs  to have  their expectation realized.  Subsequent examples will examine
cases where there was an agreement  to work toward removal of certain classes of non-tariff
barriers.  Hence, organizations and firms with an interest in liberalization would be faced with
information and negotiation  costs as well as monitoring/enforcement  costs.
Countervailing  Duties
Prior to the signing of the  CUSTA, the Canadian pork  industry had been subject to
countervailing  duties imposed by the United States.  The industry had complained about the
lack of fairness  in the U.S. countervailing duties system and the costs involved in preparing
cases against  both formal countervail proceedings  and the threat of countervail actions. Their
organizations  had lobbied hard for relief from U.S. countervail  to be included  in the CUSTA
Agreement.  There was  no resolution  to the  countervail  procedures  question,  or for that
matter the equally contentious anti-dumping procedures, at the formal CUSTA negotiations.
Instead, a temporary arrangement was negotiated and in Article  1907  of the CUSTA it was
agreed that:
The Parties shall establish  a Working Group that shall:
(a)  seek  to  develop  more  effective  rules  and  disciplines  concerning  the  use  of
government subsidies;
(b)  seek to develop  a substitute  system of rules for dealing with unfair.pricing  and
government subsidization
Further.  in Article  1906  it was agreed  that:
The  provisions  of this  Chapter  shall  be in effect  for five  years pending the
development of a substitute system of rules in both countries  for antidumping
and countervailing duties as applied  to their bilateral  trade.  If no such system
of rules is agreed  and implemented  at the end of five years the provisions of
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this Chapter shall be extended  for a further two years.  Failure to agree and
implement a new regime at the end of the two year extension shall allow either
Party to terminate the Agreement  on six months notice.
Hence, the Canadian pork industry  should have been able to expect some relief from U.S.
contingency protection  measures  after no longer than seven  years.  (Presumably  the U.S.
industry could have expected relief from equally capricious Canadian countervail  actions).
There was clearly  a commitment to find a mutually acceptable countervailing  duties system
and  a very  strong sunset clause  built  in  to  ensure  bargaining  in goodfaith.  The entire
CUSTA was to be put at risk if no resolution was found.
In theory, the Canadian pork industry should have been able to monitor the progress
of these discussions,  present its views to Canadian  negotiators and lobby the appropriate
Canadian  government  officials  to  ensure  that  progress  was  being  made.  Of  course,
contingency  protection  measures  were  an issue  for many industries  on  both sides of the
border and to keep the pressure  on would have required the Canadian pork industry to forge
alliances with other Canadian  groups or firms with an interest in improving the contingent
protection system,  as well as with allies in the United States.  Forging these alliances would
have  taken considerable  resources  given the high costs associated  with organizing  such a
diverse  group.  Admittedly,  the  resolution  of the  contingent  protection  problems  was
complicated  by the  ongoing and slower than  expected  GATT  negotiations pertaining  to
contingent protection  but it was apparent that little real progress was being made fairly early
on in the five-year mandate.  The Canadian and U.S. pork industries  and their various formal
and informal allies could not exert sufficient pressure on the negotiators to ensure that they
received  this very important expected benefit from the CUSTA.
Buried  in  the fine  print of the NAFTA  is  a clause  which removes  the seven year
deadline  for arriving at new countervail and dumping definitions and procedures (Gerber and
Kerr,  1995).  Hence,  either the pork  industries  in the United States  and Canada  and their
allies failed to allocate sufficient resources to ensure fulfillment of  the contingency protection
provisions of  the CUSTA or, alternatively, the expected (collective) benefits could not justify
the required (collective) fulfillment costs.
In  the  synopsis  of the  CUSTA  released  by  the  Government  of Canada  (1987),
Canadians were led to believe that they would be much better protected from the capricious
use of countervail than they eventually  were:
The  combined  effect  of  bilateral  review  of  the  existing  law  and  the
development of a new set of rules will be to ensure that by the time all tariffs
are  removed and  other aspects of the Agreement phased in,  Canadian firms
will have not only more  open access, but also more secure and  predictable
access (emphasis  added) (Government of Canada,  1987, p. 53).
One doubts  if the Canadian  pork  industry  currently  believes that  it has more  secure  and
predictable  access to the  U.S.  market than  was  the  case when the  new bilateral  review
procedures introduced in the CUSTA became  fully operational.
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Border Inspections
Canadian beef packers had complained  of what they perceived as capricious,  if not
strategic,  use  of border  inspections  for meat  as  a non-tariff barrier  to trade prior to  the
CUSTA negotiations.  While rejection of products at the point of export is a trade irritant for
many commodities,  it does not impose large economic  costs.  If meat products are monitored
at the border they  can be delayed  and if rejected  returned to the exporter.  Due to meat's
perishability,  delays and turn backs can lead  to deterioration  in  quality and  a subsequent
reduction  in price.
In addition, border delays or rejections will likely have other economic effects.  Given
the tight logistics parameters of cold chains for meat, delays may lead to reductions in quality
and subsequent doubt about the reliability of the exporter in the mind of  the consignee.  This
is  likely to affect  future sales  orders adversely.  Rejection of product at the border can affect
the consignee's ability to fill pre-committed  orders and, hence, raises concerns pertaining to
security of supply.  Again, this can adversely affect the ability of the exporter to secure future
sales.  Rejection of product at the border may also  lead to a reduction  in returns to processors
even if there is no deterioration  in product quality. As the meat is destined  for export, it is cut
to U.S. standards.  To the extent that product specifications  differ, if the rejected product has
to be sold in the Canadian market it will suffer a discount.  These losses must be added to the
cost of trucking to the border and back and the cost of loading and unloading the vehicle.
All  meat  leaving  Canadian export plants  (all  of which  are approved  by USDA)  is
inspected by Agriculture and AgriFood Canada veterinarians  and certified as satisfying U.S.
standards  prior to leaving the plant.  All meat exports  are, however,  also  inspected at  the
border by officials from the USDA.  These inspectors may examine a random sample of the
cartons  (known  as  skip-lot)  with  the  help  of  a  computerized  selection  process.  This
procedure generally takes about three hours.  The officials  may also choose to inspect every
carton (known as full-lot) and this requires  six hours.  Obviously, the probability of finding
unsatisfactory  product or packaging increases with the number of cartons inspected. All, or
only part, of a shipment may be refused if the product is not sealed or preserved properly or
if  the quality  is poor or is not as stated.  An increase  in the number of full-lot rather than
skip-lot  inspections may  imply  an  attempt to  reduce trade flows.  This  is also  true when
entire rather  than part loads  are rejected.  Product is often  inspected again  at the  point of
delivery.
There was some evidence that border inspections  were being used strategically to limit
imports with the  number of rejections  inversely  related to  the price of beef in the United
States (Kerr,  et al,  1986).  According  to Menzie and Prentice  (1987):
There are suspicions and some evidence, however,  that these regulations  have
been  used to control  movements beyond the legitimate levels  (p.  947).
While the degree  of  emphasis placed on this non-tariff barrier may appear excessive to those
outside  the  meat  industry,  the  organizations  and  firms  representing  the  Canadian  beef
industry  felt that border inspections were sufficiently disruptive to the operation of  the North
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American  beef market to lobby  extremely hard to have  a special provision to address the
problem written into the CUSTA.
Article 708:3  states:
Where, for agriculture,  food beverage and certain related goods other than  animals:
...  (b)  the  exporting  party  has,  pursuant  to  such  systems,  procedures  or
requirements,  determined or certified,  as the case  may be, that such  goods
meet  the  standards  or  technical  regulations  of  the  importing  Party,  the
importing Party may examine  such goods imported  from the territory of the
exporting Party only to ensure that (b) has occurred.  This provision shall not
preclude  spot  checks  or  similar  verifying  measures  necessary  to  ensure
compliance  with  the  importing  Party's  standards  or  technical  regulations
provided that such spot checks or similar verifying  measures, including  any
conducted  at  the  border,  are  conducted  no  more  frequently  than  those
conducted by the  importing Party under similar circumstances  with respect to
its goods.
The clear intent was to effectively eliminate border inspections and the interpretation  of the
agreement at the time was to move to a system whereby inspection would take place only at
the final destination of the meat.  Seven years later little has changed.
Border inspections remain an irritant.  Part of  the difficulty is that it is not clear where
the lines of authority within the U.S. government  lie in relation to having USDA comply with
the CUSTA.  One suspects that the change was resisted within the  inspection bureaucracy
due  to fears  of job  losses  and by  those  who  had  invested  in private  border  inspection
facilities.  In Canada, having the matter pressed with the U.S.  government required that the
correct officials in the Canadian  bureaucracy be identified and then convinced that the rather
narrow provision justified a concerted effort on the part of the Canadian government to press
the point with the Americans.  In other words,  was  it worth pressing the issue of border
inspections of red meat - of interest to only  one industry  - within the dynamics of the
broad spectrum of Canada-U.S. relations?  The organizations  and firms representing the red
meat industry could also have attempted to have the issue brought to the dispute settlement
mechanism  but,  again,  it  required  bringing  Canadian  officials  on  side.  These  lobbying
activities  carry a  considerable  cost  and,  as  it was  a  single  industry issue,  there were  no
prospects of finding allies among whom the costs could be shared.
This  issue can  be  couched  in the  new institutional  economics  paradigm  outlined
above.  Both nations  realized that there were gains  to be had from certifying  each others
plants for safety, and the law was written as such.  However, the border inspectors had a very
different  viewpoint  than  the  trade  negotiators  even  though  both  work  for  the  same
government.
Take the case of  a particular - and now very famous - USDA inspector in Montana,
Bill Lehman from the Sweetgrass border station.  Unlike his colleagues in Washington,  this
inspector had little contact with parties outside Montana agriculture.  Acknowledgment  by
the United  States that Canadian  packing plants are  safe not only removed the need for his
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job, but also invalidated a lifetime's work.  This particular inspector refused to implement the
new provisions and was asked to relocate.  Rather than do this, the inspector quit, and is now
a popular celebrity  in that part of Montana, and has  begun a media campaign  to convince
consumers  that  the  USDA  is  allowing  unsafe  Canadian  meat  into  the  United  States.
Although other inspectors  have not gone to this extreme,  it is easy to understand why they
are  imposing  as many  restrictions  as  the law  allows.  The  enormous  popularity  of the
inspector who quit  is also instructive.  Local beef farmers have noticed a constant  flow of
Canadian cattle  into the United States,  and given the depressed  state of United States cattle
prices in general,  it is easy to see why they assume a causal relationship between imports and
low prices.
Economists and  others promoting advantages  of free trade have  failed in two ways.
First,  we did not anticipate the reaction of the border inspectors,  and second, we did not do
a good job convincing  those producers  along the border that they would benefit from this
agreement.  To do the latter, we would have had to convince  cattle producers in Montana that
U.S. cattle  exports  from  midwestern plants  increase prices  throughout  the United  States.
This concept of a spatially integrated market does not come easily to some cattle producers
for whom  all business is local.
Beef  Grade Equivalency
Grading represents a technical  standard rather than a sanitary regulation.  Chapter Six
of the CUSTA pertains to technical standards.  According to Article 604 the Parties  agreed:
To  the  greatest  extent  possible,  and  taking  into  account  international
standardization  activities,  each  Party  shall  make  compatible  its  standards-
related measures  and procedures  for product approval with those of the other
Party.
where make compatible:
means  the  process  by  which  differing  standards,  technical  regulations  or
certification systems of  the same scope which have been approved by differing
standardizing  bodies  are  recognized  as being either  identical  or technically
equivalent in practice  (emphasis  added) (Article  609).
Differences  in grading standards have been recognized  as an impediment to the creation of
a single North American market  for beef for a number of years (Kerr,  1992).  As  a result,
boxed choice Canadian beef sold  into the United States must be sold  at a no-roll discount.
Boxed U.S.  Select beef must be sold into Quebec and Ontario as ungraded beef and, hence,
does not receive the premiums associated with equivalent quality graded Canadian  beef. The
net result is lower sales and returns  in both markets.  A single market does not yet exist.  As
a result of Canada unilaterally  changing some of its grading procedures,  as of January  1,
1996,  Canada  and  the  United  States  have  been  using  the  exactly  the  same  methods  for
grading beef quality (Hayes et al.,  1995).
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Grade equivalency  would have to be approved  by both governments.  It should be
noted that there is no  mechanism within  either government or bilaterally  to push  for the
implementation  of Chapter Six of the CUSTA.  This means that lobbying must be done by
interested parties.  Grade equivalency is unlikely to be approved if it is opposed by  a major
organization on either side of the border.  According to Thomas (1996):
The Canadian  Cattlemen's Association  supports cross-border grades,  but the
U.S.  cattle  industry is  much more  skeptical  -in  some  cases, even hostile
(p.56).
The Canadian Cattlemen's Association had to undertake  a long process  of consultations to
bring the National Cattlemen's Beef Association (NCBA) on side in the United States and:
Grade  equalization  got  a  kick  at  the  can  in  1994  when  it  made  it  to the
National Cattlemen's Association (NCA) annual meeting. Unfortunately, it was
tabled at the meeting  in favour of further study (Thomas,  1996,  p. 56).
A study was subsequently commissioned to respond to questions raised by a subgroup of the
National Cattlemen's Association's U.S.-Canada Grade Equivalency Task Force.  The major
conclusion of the study was that it would be beneficial to the  industry if the market for beef
was approached  from a Single Market perspective:
The overall effect would be to allow the North American packing industry  to
operate more efficiently. This effect is equivalent to cutting the packer margin
by  a  small  amount.  The  volume  of U.S.  beef  exports  to  Canada  and  of
Canadian beef exports to the United States would increase (Hayes et al,  1995).
Despite the results of the study, there is still resistance to the granting of grading equivalence
and:
At  the  moment,  grading  negotiations  with  the  National  Cattlemen's  Beef
Association  have  been  suspended  until  a  better  negotiating  climate  arises
(Thomas,  1996, p. 56).
Meanwhile,  the Canadian  Cattlemen's  Association  (CCA)  continues  to  expend resources
attempting to gain allies  in the United  States.  For example,  in 1996:
Questions about the Canadian industry from U.S. producers frustrated with the
market prompted the CCA to invite a delegation to tour Canadian feedlots and
packing plants in mid-June.  The tour was aimed at helping our major trading
partner understand the Canadian  industry and recent trade patterns.
... The quality of our genetics and commercial production practices, plus the
high safety  standards of our packing plants,  was demonstrated in detail.
...  All in all, the Montana and Idaho cattlemen were impressed with what they
saw (Grogen,  1996, p.  32).
This is  all part of the expensive process  of recruiting  allies for the removal of non-tariff
barriers  and the mental movement to the concept of a single continental market. According
to Dennis Laycraft of  the CCA:
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Right now there are knowledgeable  U.S. ranchers willing to stand up at NCBA
meetings and promote  freer trade with Canada. They are being listened to,  and
that, for me, is a bright sign for better things to come (Thomas,  1996, p. 56).
This  is  a  case  where  both  consumers  and  producers  would  have  benefited  from
removal  of a  barrier.  Yet,  the USDA  reaction  was to  defer  to the  wishes  of U.S.  beef
producers who opposed the chain.  The U.S. beef producers were made aware of the benefits
but they  came out against equivalency.  There are two possible reasons  for this position.
First, the  discussions were dominated  by producers  in border areas who  did not want any
Canadian imports  and beef producers  in the U.S.  corn belt who stood to gain by accessing
central Canadian markets  were not as vocal.
The  argument that  eventually won  the  day was that the  words  US Choice were a
highly  valuable  U.S.  trade  mark  and  should  not  be  shared  with  the  competition.  This
argument  won despite  an explicit provision  that prohibited the  Canadians  from using this
brand outside the United States.
The  current  situation  is one where both sides  have  almost identical  standards,  but
where Choice Canadian carcasses must cross the United States border as live animals so that
they can be graded in the United States. Likewise, Select US meat must sell at discounts in
Central Canada because it cannot be labeled A.
Economists  in the United States have failed to convince U.S. beef producers that the
North  American  beef market  is now  spatially  integrated.  We have  failed  to  convince
producers of the benefits of free trade.
Again, we see schizophrenic  behaviour on behalf of the U.S.  government.  One arm,
the  trade negotiators,  assumed that the other arm  would follow its lead.  Meanwhile,  the
group responsible  for grading was responding only to the needs of a relatively  small group,
and it chose to let policy be dictated by that one  group.
Clearly, the removal of non-tariff barriers  imposes considerable fulfillment costs  on
the industry organizations  in both countries.  Once the organizations themselves  accept the
proposition of grading  equivalence,  the  long process  of convincing the governments will
begin.
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Rules  for Importation of Animals  and Animal Products
Under  Article  708  of the CUSTA  relating  to  health,  sanitary  and phytosanitary
regulations the Parties agree to:
(  notify and consult with each other during the  development or prior to the
implementation  or  change  in the application of any  technical regulation  or
technical  standard that may affect trade in such goods.
On April  18,  1996,  the USDA's  Animal  and  Plant Health  Inspection  Service  (APHIS)
published a set of proposed Importation of Animals and Animals Products Rules.  While the
issues  are  complex,  one  intent of the rules  is  to  allow for regional  differences  in  health
standards  whereas  in the existing rules animal health status was determined  on a national
basis.  The new regulations also assign risk levels to regions.  The greater the assigned risk
levels, the more stringent the animal exporting procedures required.  The CCA believes  that
the levels of risk assigned to Canada have the potential to considerably reduce trade in live
animals from current levels.  It would appear that the USDA developed  these proposals in
isolation -which contravenes  the spirit, if not the letter of the CUSTA.  The CCA and other
interested  Canadian  parties  are  now restricted  to a  reactive  role rather than  having been
consulted  during the development of the rules.  This  is in spite of CCA initiatives taken in
conjunction with the NCBA in the United States.  The two organizations had formed a Cross-
Border Animal Health Committee  in 1993.
The major problem seems to be that either the USDA did not feel obligated to consult
with Canada ex ante about the development of the regulations,  or if a government body was
consulted in Canada,  the CCA did not have their  ear.  While the USDA did subsequently
receive responses  from interested  Canadian organizations,  this appears  to be far  from the
active process of consultation envisioned in the CUSTA.  The government agencies  in each
country still approach regulation  from a national rather than a single market perspective and,
as a result, new non-tariff barriers  can still arise. According to Thomas (1997):
One  senior  trade  analyst  told  Cattlemen the  USDA  proposal  is  a  scary
document, nothing more than a non-tariff barrier (p. 41).
Presumably, this is what the CUSTA provisions on sanitary non-tariff barriers to trade were
intended to prevent.
United States International Trade Commission  332 Study
Simply  keeping  informed  of potential  problems  in  the  non-tariff  area  may  be
expensive.  In  November,  1996  the  U.S  Congress  ordered  the  International  Trade
Commission to conduct a 332 study into the effects of new WTO trade rules on U.S. imports
of live cattle for slaughter and fresh,  chilled and frozen beef.  It also called for a review of
the steps the  United States has taken to prevent trans-shipment  of these products  through
Mexico  and Canada.  While the study itself cannot trigger a trade action, once the report is
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released an official complaint can be launched with the U.S. Department of Commerce based
on the information in the report.
While 332  studies are not covered by the WTO or the NAFTA, what is disconcerting
is that the Canadian  industry was taken by surprise:
This time, the 332 came out of the blue-  tossed into an omnibus agricultural
marketing bill that passed through Congress just before the politicians headed
off to campaign  for the November elections.  In  fact the Canadian Cattlemen's
Association  first heard about it from their Washington  lawyers,  not from U.S.
cattlemen  (Winslow,  1996, p.  6)
Clearly the CCA had not expended sufficient resources  to acquire  information.  With better
information,  as a best case the Congress could have been lobbied and the study dropped from
the Bill.  In the worst  case, the CCA  would have  had more time to prepare  input into  the
study and to consult with U.S. beef organizations  to reduce the probability  of  their launching
a formal complaint with the Department of Commerce.
SUMMARY  AND  CONCLUSIONS
From the few examples  outlined above,  it should be clear that the process of reducing
non-tariff barriers and preventing new non-tariff barriers  from arising is a resource  intensive
activity  much  more  resource  intensive  than  reducing  formal  trade  barriers.  These
examples are only representative of the hundreds  of issues that have arisen since the coming
into  being  of the CUSTA,  NAFTA  and  the  WTO.  These  large  costs  arise  because  the
responsibility  for  administering  non-tariff barriers  is  diffused  among  a large  number of
government organizations.  The lines of responsibility for ensuring the implementation  of
trade commitments  are not clear within the wider machinery  of government and by their very
nature,  non-tariff barriers  tend to be industry  specific,  hence,  it is more  difficult to  build
politically  effective  alliances.  In  contrast,  tariff  policy  is  the  responsibility  of one
government  department  and  the  responsibility  for  tariff reduction  is  well  defined  and
understood. Further,  tariffs are transparent  while most non-tariff barriers  are not.
New Institutional Economics has had an important role in explaining the workings of
economic systems.  Transaction costs have provided insights into the success and efficiency
of complex transactions.  Trade agreements  share  many characteristics  with the  contracts
which are often used to facilitate complex transactions.  Extending  the concept of transaction
costs to the processes required to ensure the liberalization  of non-tariff barriers-  fulfillment
costs - hopefully  provides  insights into  the difficulties  associated  with the  creation of a
single  market.  By  using the  information,  negotiation  and  monitoring/enforcement  cost
framework,  organizations  can  begin to  think  formally  about the  resources  they  need  to
expend to accomplish  the removal of non-tariff barriers.  Further, once costs are identified,
means to reduce them can  be sought individually or collectively.  Clearly,  high fulfillment
costs can themselves  act as  a non-tariff barrier to trade.
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As formal  barriers to trade  in livestock  and red meat have, for the most part, been
removed from the continental  market as a result of the CUSTA  and NAFTA, the discussion
of the  costs  associated  with  removing  non-tariff barriers  is  particularly  relevant  to  the
creation of a single market.  Once the major  organizations representing  livestock and red
meat interests  begin to approach  problems  from a single  market perspective,  negotiation
costs will fall and the pace of  progress toward the goal will increase.  Governments also need
to think about how to reduce fulfillment costs. One problem within the NAFTA, and within
the three national governments,  is that there is no institution with a prime responsibility for
the promotion of trade liberalization  and ensuring that the agreements are implemented.  The
Office of the U.S.  Trade Representative  and  its counterparts  in Canada  and Mexico  have
responsibilities which are inherently protectionist.  One possible means  to reduce fulfillment
costs would be to create trilaterally,  or within the individual countries,  a Trade Ombudsman
with responsibility  for implementing the agreements and  through which interested parties
could obtain information and provide input as to how the removal of non-tariff barriers could
be facilitated.  The Ombudsman could be given the power to intervene when a department
was seen to be dragging  its feet or acting to thwart implementation  of  the  international trade
agreement.
The process of removing non-tariff barriers  to trade  is in its infancy.  New and  less
costly  institutions  will  be  required  to  ensure  that  progress  toward  single  markets  is
maintained.  Using the fulfillment cost framework outlined in this paper may be a useful first
step.
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